Who Should Be Concerned about Iraq’s Low Female Labor Participation?
About twenty percent of Iraqi women between the ages of 16 and 64 are currently employed or seeking employment, according to 2017 World Bank data. This low female labor force participation (FLFP) hinders the country’s economic growth and exacerbates the ongoing gender discrimination that Iraqi women face.
Iraq’s FLFP, which is low compared to many other Middle Eastern countries, should be concerning for policy makers who care about the country’s economic challenges, gender-related issues, and politically reinforced clientelism labor market. Therefore, it is a challenging issue for political leaders, rights groups, and business people.
Iraqi female workers have never played a proportionally sufficient role in the country’s economy, nor been included in its labor market. On the one hand, there are women suffering from lack of opportunities who have been excluded from the job market because of various social, and political factors; on the other hand, the country’s economy can’t create enough opportunities to take advantage of their skills. As a result, much of Iraq’s human resources are wasted.
The Labor Issue through a Developing Economic Lens
The situation in Iraq is also found in several other developing economies. Similar to many middle- and low-income countries, women’s economic concerns in Iraq are still about within-families resource distribution, the right to inherit, and access to market activities or factors of production. However, in developed countries their concerns are mostly about gender wage-gap and job-promotions.
Scholars studying economic trends in developing countries have used a U-shaped hypothesis to analyze FLFP. This hypothesis describes the socio-economic phenomenon in which women workers undergo a three-stage transition by moving from rural areas and villages to urban areas and city centers.
With modernization and development, women lost jobs in the farming sector as their households moved to urban areas. In the new urban economy, men found enough blue-collar jobs, but women could not, and their labor participation dramatically dropped. It took women time to attain the education required to acquire white-collar jobs in urban areas and ultimately raise their labor participation, according to the U-shaped scenario.
World Bank data shows how minor the role of women is in Iraq’s current labor market. The 20 percent FLFP corresponds to 75 percent of men’s labor force participation.
Some social, tribal, and religious norms have contributed to this low FLFP in Iraq, and they basically obstruct Iraqi women from getting white collar jobs during the U-shaped transition. Some of the norms have been reinforced by political regimes before and after 2003.
For example, in late 2017, the Wasit Provincial Council issued an order preventing women from working in all cafes and casinos. Even though the order was not supported by any constitutional legislation, no relevant government institutions tried to cancel it.
The Role of Political Regimes
The International Labour Organization (ILO) and World Bank data showed great improvement in female labor participation between 1991 (9.6 %) and 2008 (19.2 %), about 10 percentage points improvement. However, from 2008 till 2017, the labor participation has not risen even one percentage point.
There is no doubt Iraqi the political elite that followed the 2003 regime-change performed better than the previous ruling elites by having made some good efforts. However, the eight years of stagnation are worrying.
What politicians and lawmakers do directly affects the quality and quantity of FLFP. Some historical facts and statistics demonstrate how important the role of political regimes is in the acceleration of FLFP in developing countries.
In the 1950s, political regimes in Iraq and Egypt changed. The secular revolutionary regimes that replaced monarchies actually changed the economic and social dynamics of the U-shaped transition. In both countries, women’s labor participation increased in paid work, and access to education dramatically rose as the new regimes increased FLFP in the public sector — in educational institutions in particular.
The regimes overturned some social norms to the benefit of women. For instance, in the early 1980s, women held 55 percent of all Egyptian government jobs, which was the main sector in the country’s economy at the time. However, in Saudi Arabia, which has similar religious and ethnic characteristics, regime change did not happen, and women’s labor participation was discouraged by the Saudi conservative regime. Consequently, in 1990, FLFP was 14.5% in Saudi Arabia but 21.34%in Egypt.
Nevertheless, FLFP cannot be raised only by certain types of political regimes. Favorable regimes can’t be helpful without normal economic growth, stability, and other factors of development. The data shows that regime change did not raise FLFP in Iraq, as it was just 8.12% in 1990.
Effects of Economic Growth
Some empirical evidence shows that as household income rises, women’s labor participation decreases in poor and middle-income countries since many women work just out of economic necessity. But this is not the case in Iraq. The underlying long trend in Iraq’s economy might blur our understanding of the current situation. Some empirical evidences show that as household income rises, women labor participation decreases in poor and middle-income countries since many women work just out of economic necessity. But, this is not the case in Iraq. The underlying long trend in Iraq’s economy might blur our understanding of the current situation.
Some empirical evidences show that as household income rises, women labor participation decreases in poor and middle-income countries since many women work just out of economic necessity. But, this is not the case in Iraq. The underlying long trend in Iraq’s economy might blur our understanding of the current situation. Some empirical evidences show that as household income rises, women labor participation decreases in poor and middle-income countries since many women work just out of economic necessity. But, this is not the case in Iraq. The underlying long trend in Iraq’s economy might blur our understanding of the current situation.
Some empirical evidences show that as household income rises, women labor participation decreases in poor and middle-income countries since many women work just out of economic necessity. But, this is not the case in Iraq. The underlying long trend in Iraq’s economy might blur our understanding of the current situation. Some empirical evidences show that as household income rises, women labor participation decreases in poor and middle-income countries since many women work just out of economic necessity. But, this is not the case in Iraq. The underlying long trend in Iraq’s economy might blur our understanding of the current situation. Some empirical evidences show that as household income rises, women labor participation decreases in poor and middle-income countries since many women work just out of economic necessity. But, this is not the case in Iraq. The underlying long trend in Iraq’s economy might blur our understanding of the current situation. Some empirical evidences show that as household income rises, women labor participation decreases in poor and middle-income countries since many women work just out of economic necessity. But, this is not the case in Iraq. The underlying long trend in Iraq’s economy might blur our understanding of the current situation. Some empirical evidencesshow that as household income rises, women labor participation decreases in poor and middle-income countries since many women work just out of economic necessity. But, this is not the case in Iraq. The underlying long trend in Iraq’s economy might blur our understanding of the current situation. The ILO data shows that Iraqi women’s labor-force participation grew slowly between 2008 and 2018. Likewise, gross national income (GNI) also increased (but at a faster rate) in the same time. The figures show that Iraqi women entered the labor market while per capita GNI rose as the following graph demonstrates.
The data sets illustrate that gross national income (G.N.I) based on purchasing power parity increased from 12,360 USD in 2008 to 17,010 USD in 2017.
In Iraq, contrary to some conventional economic theories, as GNI per capita grew, female labor participation did also. As income increased, more women moved from within-family unpaid work to paid employment. The positive-income effect is consistent with the U-shaped hypothesis.
What Should Policy Makers Do?
To overcome the lack of FLFP, the Iraqi government needs to act to remove social, political, and cultural barriers that discourage women from entering the labor market. It has to reform administrative and financial policies and come up with new regulations that encourage women’s work.
Neither sustainable development nor steady economic growth will be achieved without active and proportionally sufficient FLFP. Investing in Iraqi people to improve human capital is the key for any developmental projects in the country.
It would not be realistic to expect that all obstacles that Iraq’s underdeveloped private and public sectors pose to female labors will easily be removed. However, there could be some special protecting regulations and laws to encourage women in workplaces and guarantee their basic rights. For instance, providing a safe work environment free of sexual harassment can encourage many women to enter the labor market.
A new survey, conducted mostly in Baghdad, shows that 42 percent of women workers have faced some sexual harassment in their workplace. This is one of the factors that usually discourages women from entering urban and rural labor markets. Here, government policies and regulations could play a crucial role.
In addition, empowering programs such as vocational training, awareness raising, and small business-building could bring many Iraqi women into the labor market. And legal and institutional protection can create a friendly and encouraging environment for female laborers.